Edição #43
Latitude 55.7558 - Moscovo
Enquanto as tropas russas invadem as ruas da Ucrânia, o cobarde e demente ditador russo estará confortavelmente sentado no sala da presidência, algures no Kremlin, em Moscovo.
Como há muitos especialistas de guerra a aparecer nas TVs, jornais e, sobretudo, onde se decidem as coisas hoje em dia - no Twitter -, não me parece proveitoso abordar o conflito armado também aqui. Assim, viro as atenções, nesta edição, para o homem que começou a guerra: Vladimir V. Putin.
E começamos de forma suave, com esta bonita, precisa e actual descrição do presidente russo:
On 24 February, the armor of the “enlightened autocrat” that had housed Vladimir Putin for the previous 20 years cracked and fell to pieces. The world saw a monster –crazed in its desires and ruthless in its decisions. The monster had grown gradually, gaining strength from year to year, marinating in its own absolute authority, imperial aggression, hatred for western democracy, and malice fueled by the resentment engendered by the fall of the USSR. Now, Europe will have to deal, not with the former Putin, but the new Putin who has cast aside his mask of “business partnership” and “peaceful collaboration”. There shall never again be peace with him.
Mas o que agora vemos, e que já há muito pudemos constatar (de resto, a Rússia é o arquétipo das ditaduras modernas), nem sempre assim foi; quando ascendeu ao poder presidencial, Putin ainda se esforçou em, dissimuladamente ou não, passar uma mensagem diferente da dos seus antecessores:
It seemed to many that the man ascending the heights of the Russian pyramid of power was an intelligent official devoid of pride and arrogance and a modern individual who understood that post-Soviet Russia had only one possible path into the future: democracy. He talked about democracy quite a bit in his interviews back then, promising the citizens of the Russian Federation continued reforms, free elections, freedom of speech, the observance of human rights by the authorities, cooperation with the west, and, most importantly, a constant rotation of those in power.
“I have no intention of holding on to this chair!” he said.
Se é certo que as guerras começam nos nacionalismos, que se tornam depois movimentos imperialistas, é preciso uma cola que aglutine e mobilize, pelo menos, parte do povo - ou parte do exército, no caso de uma ditadura. Essa cola, neste caso, é uma grande mentira:
Vladimir Putin’s regime has banned Russian media from referring to his invasion of Ukraine as a ‘war’. Instead, it is to be framed as ‘an operation to liberate Ukraine from neo-Nazis’.
The state-run RIA news agency has published lurid propaganda arguing that Russia ‘for the second time in history will take on the burden of responsibility for the liberation of Ukraine from Nazism’. Readers are told that ‘filling in the swastika only slightly with cosmetic correction and high-quality powder’ was ‘the main method of building Ukrainian statehood’. Now, Russia is carrying out a ‘denazification’ operation ‘in the interests of all Europe, even if Europe is not aware of it’.
Finanças e activos
À medida que as sanções económicas vão ferindo não só a população comum como também a oligarquia russa, os bens de Putin estarão salvaguardados - aliás, tão bem guardados que nem sabe sabe exactamente como é que os detém:
In fact, very little is known about what Mr. Putin owns and where it could be. Despite years of speculation and rumor, the extent of his wealth remains maddeningly opaque, even as billions of dollars have sluiced through the accounts of his close friends and luxury properties have been connected to family members. Officially, Mr. Putin earns about $140,000 a year and owns a small apartment, according to his public financial disclosures.
But that would not account for “Putin’s Palace,” a vast estate on the Black Sea estimated to have cost more than $1 billion
Nor would the disclosures account for “Putin’s Yacht,” a $100 million luxury vessel long tied to him in speculative news reports.
There is also the $4.1 million apartment in Monaco, purchased through an offshore company by a woman reported to be Mr. Putin’s lover.
And there is the expensive villa in the South of France linked to his ex-wife.
Líderes europeus
Numa ordem internacional que a oeste não conhecia guerra até 24 de fevereiro (Iraque, Síria, Afeganistão, Palestina estão lá longe e pouco importam), o que imperava era a diplomacia, o acenar de acordos prévios ou ameaça - muito no limite - de sanções económicas.
Não surpreende, uma vez que a diplomaciaé cada vez mais um meio de sobrevivência política de quem a exerce do que propriamente uma desvantagem a quem é destinada. No fundo, realpolitik no seu esplendor, importando-se pouco com a natureza dos problemas e torcendo para que estes não rebentem, agora literalmente, nas mãos dos líderes actuais:
Merkel admitted that, in her opinion, Putin lives in his own fantasy land. If that’s so, what’s the point of seriously engaging with such a ruler? He’s not a writer or an artist, he has to live in the real world and be responsible for every single one of his words. For 16 years, Merkel, who grew up in the GDR and should therefore understand Putin’s true nature, “has established a dialogue”.
The results of that dialogue: the seizure of certain territories in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, the capture of the DPR and LPR, and now: a full-scale war with Ukraine. After the war with Georgia and the seizure of its territories, the “peacemaker” Obama offered Putin … a reset of their relations! Which is to say, c’mon, Vladimir, let’s forget all of that and start from scratch. The result of that “reset” was the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine.
Mas toda gente sabe, há demasiado tempo, donde Putin vinha e como lidava com os seus inimigos políticos. Eis os nomes de alguns:
Alexei Navalny: Anti-Putin activist, in August 2020, Navalny was hospitalized in serious condition after he was poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent. He was medically evacuated to Berlin and discharged a month later. Navalny accused Putin of being responsible for his poisoning, and an investigation implicated agents from the Federal Security Service. On 17 January 2021, he returned to Russia and was detained on accusations of violating parole conditions (imposed as a result of his 2014 conviction) because he had failed to report to Russia's Federal Prison Service (FSIN) twice per month during his illness
Sergei Skripal: A former Russian double agent who passed secrets to British intelligence, Skripal, 66, and his daughter Yulia, 33, were found unconscious on a bench outside a shopping centre in the English cathedral city of Salisbury in March, 2018.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: The Russian opposition activist says he believes attempts were made to poison him in 2015 and 2017. A German laboratory later found elevated levels of mercury, copper, manganese and zinc in him
Alexander Litvinenko: The ex-KGB agent and outspoken critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin died aged 43 after drinking green tea laced with polonium-210, a rare and potent radioactive isotope, at London’s Millennium Hotel.
Alexander Perepilichny: The 44-year-old Russian was found dead near his luxury home on an exclusive gated estate outside London after he had been out jogging in November 2012. Perepilichny had sought refuge in Britain in 2009 after helping a Swiss investigation into a Russian money-laundering scheme. His sudden death raised suggestions he might have been murdered.
Viktor Yushchenko: When a Ukrainian opposition leader, Yushchenko was poisoned during the campaign for the 2004 presidential election in which he stood on a pro-western ticket against the pro-Moscow prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich.
Amigos europeus
Tenho sempre bastante interesse em perceber como é que as afinidades políticas determinam ações concretas, neste caso, de censura ou de apoio. Putin, que histórica e oficialmente encabeça o Partido Comunista Russo, tem tido o privilégio de recolher apoio vindo de uma interessante mixórdia ideológica:
For years, a global choir of right-wing politicians have sung the praises of Vladimir V. Putin. They looked up to the Russian strongman as a defender of closed borders, Christian conservatism and bare-chested machismo in an era of liberal identity politics and Western globalization. Fawning over him was a core part of the populist playbook.
Mas agora vemos que, por exemplo e por cá, André Ventura condenou as ações de Putin. Porquê?
Certas guerras são péssimas para a manutenção do status quo (outras, curiosamente, servem precisamente para o contrário), dificultando a implementação ou reivindicação de um agenda iliberal, de que a extrema-direita tanto é fã.
“It will be a decisive blow to them,” said Lucio Caracciolo, the editor of the Italian geopolitical magazine Limes, who considered Mr. Putin’s invasion an irrational, and potentially, a politically suicidal move. He said that members of the international ultraright who enjoyed a special relationship and financial support from Mr. Putin were “in serious trouble.”
Isto é um exemplo paradigmático de que pouco importa se as ditaduras são estados avançados de regimes iliberais de esquerda ou da direita. A democracia liberal opõe-se tanto a uns como a outros, pois só ela pode dar resposta às necessidades de direitos, garantias e liberdades de todas as pessoas.
Veja-se também o caso do provável adversário de Macron, nas presidenciais de Abril próximo:
[…] Éric Zemmour, has in the past called the prospect of a French equivalent of Mr. Putin a “dream” and admired the Russian’s efforts to restore “an empire in decline.” Like many other Putin enthusiasts he doubted an invasion was in the cards and blamed the United States for spreading what he called “propaganda.”
But on Thursday he, too, denounced the invasion, saying “Russia was neither attacked nor directly threatened by Ukraine” in a speech given at a lectern that, to make things extra clear, displayed a sign reading, “I fully condemn the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.”
A propósito, uma explicação de porque é que Putin se dá tão bem com representantes do que supostamente seria uma facção completamente oposta em Putin doesn't fear NATO or Ukraine — He fears democracy.
Por último, quanto a quem deveria apoiar inequivocamente Putin, o PC Chinês, eis porque não o faz, retirado do artigo Putin e a nova ordem mundial:
Putin lançou o caos no equilíbrio financeiro das nações, pondo em perigo o contexto global das trocas comerciais e ameaçando a estabilidade dos mercados de consumo, exportação e importação, da Europa e dos Estados Unidos. E isso não interessa à China.
Outras leituras sobre o tema:
Why Vladimir Putin has already lost this war
Less than a week into the war, it seems increasingly likely that Vladimir Putin is heading towards a historic defeat. He may win all the battles but lose the war. Putin’s dream of rebuilding the Russian empire has always rested on the lie that Ukraine isn’t a real nation, that Ukrainians aren’t a real people, and that the inhabitants of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv yearn for Moscow’s rule. That’s a complete lie – Ukraine is a nation with more than a thousand years of history, and Kyiv was already a major metropolis when Moscow was not even a village. But the Russian despot has told his lie so many times that he apparently believes it himself.
Nations are ultimately built on stories. Each passing day adds more stories that Ukrainians will tell not only in the dark days ahead, but in the decades and generations to come. The president who refused to flee the capital, telling the US that he needs ammunition, not a ride; the soldiers from Snake Island who told a Russian warship to “go fuck yourself”; the civilians who tried to stop Russian tanks by sitting in their path. This is the stuff nations are built from. In the long run, these stories count for more than tanks.
Putin’s claim to rid Ukraine of Nazis is especially absurd given its history
In his address to the Russian people on Feb. 24, 2022, Putin said the purpose was to “protect people” who had been “subjected to bullying and genocide … for the last eight years. And for this we will strive for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine.”
The victims of the genocide claimed by Putin are Russian speakers; the Nazis he referenced are the elected representatives of the Ukrainian people. While Ukraine’s new language laws have upset some minorities, independent news media have uncovered no evidence of genocide against Russian speakers. In fact, as the historian Timothy Snyder has pointed out, Russian speakers have more freedom in Ukraine than they have in Russia, where Putin’s authoritarian government routinely suppresses political dissent. And while far right groups have been growing in Ukraine, their electoral power is limited.
Outras Histórias
Putin Accidentally Started a Revolution in Germany
In seven days, Germany has axed its biggest Russian energy project, imposed sanctions that will cause significant pain at home, and instituted a course that will make Germany the largest European defense spender, with the most advanced aircraft and a growing forward presence in Central and Eastern Europe. One can wonder whether Germany’s dedicated detractors in Washington will notice. How did it happen so quickly, when German officials had so tenaciously defended their status quo policies for so long?
Direita caviar, mas não só
O país deixou de dar resposta à aspiração de mobilidade social e, goste-se ou não, quem tem hoje um discurso político aspiracional é a IL. O problema da esquerda (sobretudo à esquerda do PS) não é excesso de radicalidade. É a ausência de radicalidade. Fala de coisas importantes que tocam a vida prática das pessoas: rendimentos, reformas, salário mínimo, tarifa social da eletricidade. Ou de novas clivagens sociais que até mobilizam muitos jovens e que para a IL não são mais do que um carimbo de modernidade a que não dedicam qualquer energia. Mas, no esforço de moderação para ter conquistas práticas, deixou de dizer em que sociedade quer viver. E isso é o que mobiliza jovens para a política. A ideia de que isto pode ser diferente. A IL percebeu-o e não teve medo de exagerar.
When Women Make Headlines
So, if women are underrepresented in the news to begin with, what does it look like when women do make headlines? And how have headlines about women changed over time?
To explore these questions, we have visualized the language used in women-centered headlines and how this language has (or has not) changed over time. Using keywords associated with the word “woman” (like girl, mother and lady), we collected and analyzed 382,139 headlines published between 2005 and 2021 by the top English-language news publications and news agencies.
Kandinsky Painting Returned to Jewish Heirs by Amsterdam Museum
“As a city, we bear a great responsibility for dealing with the indescribable suffering and injustice inflicted on the Jewish population in the Second World War”, Touria Meliani, a deputy mayor, said in the statement. “To the extent that anything can be restored, we as a society have a moral duty to act accordingly.”
The heirs and city agreed that the restitution “does justice to the principle of returning works of art that were involuntarily removed from possession during the Second World War due to circumstances directly related to the Nazi regime”, according to a statement announcing the transfer.
Corporations Raise Prices as Consumers Spend ‘With a Vengeance’
Companies are taking advantage of a moment of hot and seemingly unshakable demand — one in which consumers are spending “with a vengeance,” to borrow the words of one executive — to cover rising costs and to expand their profit margins to prepandemic or even record levels. Corporate executives have spent recent earnings calls bragging about their newfound power to raise prices, often predicting that it will last.
Antes de fechar
Temos assistido a muita tontice no Instagram com as influencers a tentar capitalizar a guerra. Mas estou convicto de que estas podem ser uma ferramenta muito importante, tal como creio que já o são no quotidiano.
O papel das redes sociais durante períodos de conflito militar não tem assim tanta literatura, apesar de não ser propriamente novo - recordem-se as manifestações organizadas, aquando da Primavera Árabe, através do Facebook.
Ainda assim, tratando-se de uma invasão a um estado soberano, vale a pena perceber o que é que as redes podem fazer pelo país invadido. O especialista em plataformas web e redes sociais Casey Newton abordou o tema esta semana no seu substack:
After being widely credited for Trump’s election in 2016, and preparing to initiate the biggest war of the social network era, Russia might have been expected to excel at information warfare. Instead, like the rest of the war, it has gone quite badly for them. It is Ukraine that has been masterful in its use of social media — and while that may not prove decisive in whether or not it overcomes Russia’s superior military, at the very least it complicates our understanding of big tech and democracy.
Para fechar
Naturalmente, deixa qualquer democrata feliz ver as notícias da abertura de fronteiras para o acolhimento de ucranianos. O mesmo em relação à redução de burocracia da União Europeia para facilitar a circulação dos refugiados de guerra.
Pena é que esses critérios estejam indexados à proximidade das latitudes com o que é entendido com o centro, o ocidente. Vivemos uma crise migratória há mais de uma década e não há vontade em abrir fronteiras. Refugiados que fogem da guerra na Síria não têm os mesmos privilégios.
O argumento é que estes países não fazem parte da Europa? E depois? Não são pessoas como as outras? Têm direito a menos pela infelicidade de terem nascido noutro lugar? Que sorte a nossa, então…